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A Slightly Polemical Comment on
Austin Sarat
Peter Brooks*
The metaphysicians of Tlon are not looking for truth,
nor even for an approximation of it;
they are after a kind of amazement.
Jorge Luis Borges1
Let me begin by registering three points of emphatic agreement
with Austin Sarat's invigorating remarks. First, like Sarat, I believe
that bringing the humanities to, and into, the law is not a matter of
"uplift and inspiration," though it is often so understood. Such an
anodyne model of the "Law and Humanities" movement ultimately
trivializes the interrogative force of the humanities while changing
nothing in the practice of legal thinking. Second, I agree that currently
the humanistic study of the law remains very much a handmaiden of
legal studies, if not more accurately a scullery maid. Finally, I think
an undergraduate liberal arts program that includes attention to the
law and legal thinking is in itself very desirable.
Nonetheless, I fear that Sarat's proposal of a "cultural studies of
law" risks giving us a formula for impotence. I say this in part because
I believe the cultural studies model offers no panacea. In the
humanities, we have seen cultural studies become a kind of hotel
lobby where all disciplines can hang out, brought together in a self-
satisfied discourse on the implication of knowledge with power, on the
marginal and the hegemonic; a somewhat desultory conversation at
times because cultural studies as a field or a metadiscipline has not
really proposed any powerful new theory or analytic model. I
overstate the case-much animating work has been done in the name
of cultural studies-because I think there is a mirage effect in the very
label of cultural studies, whereas when you get to the field of practice,
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you find little that provides a unifying and productive paradigm for
the field.
I fear in fact that Sarat's position may unintentionally come to
resemble that of Richard Posner, who believes that law and literature
should be kept separate from one another, each in its watertight
compartment. Posner anticipates an unfortunate contamination of one
by the other if we fail to understand that we can and should be
"intentionalists" in reading the law and "new critics"-noninten-
tionalists-in reading literature. Posner's claim is, of course, entirely
valid in view of the different purposes of law and literature. Yet his
desire to maintain a separation between law and literature misses the
opportunity provided precisely by reading in a different way,
otherwise, in an optics created for other purposes.
If law and literature are kept chastely apart-or allowed to
miscegenate only in the self-contained sphere of cultural studies-we
miss the opportunity for interference and subversion of one by the
other. What literary study (to stay with the field of the humanities I
know best) can bring to the law has, in my view, little to do with
uplift and inspiration. Rather, literary study can propose to the law a
kind of slow, close textual reading which at its best can, when trained
on legal texts, produce a kind of bemusement or even astonishment:
like that amazement sought by the philosophers of T16n, in Jorge Luis
Borges's tale.2
To suggest in briefest compass what literary "close reading" can
bring to the law, let me mention, as one example, the hermeticism of
the law. The hermeticism of legal language is, of course, necessary to
the law's internal self-definition and its self-policing. There are
carefully crafted and well-defined terms of legal art that are not part
of everyday discourse, and indeed are exclusive of it. But as well as
terms of the legal techne that do not translate into the language of
everyday life, there are words that figure in mainstream discourse that
the law uses in a recondite and idiosyncratic way. Where this language
concerns the motivations and intentions and mental states of human
actors, for instance, the law sometimes professionally deforms the
common tongue-and then ends up believing in its own professional-
ly-deformed definitions, treating them as if they were adequate
representations of real actors in the real world.
To take an example that I have recently studied in my course,
"Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law," consider Chief Justice Burger's
argument that a Christmas creche in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, is
2. See id.
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merely a "passive symbol."3 Consider also Justice O'Connor's
contention, in the same case, that the symbol has both an "inten-
tional" and an "objective" meaning,4 and that she can decide what
may be "fairly understood" to be the meaning of the symbol.5 Space
permitting, I would demonstrate that Burger and O'Connor offer a
somewhat crazed understanding of semiotic communication that shows
the law, in this area, to be living in a self-postulated world of
definitions that needs to be tested against discourses that have
thought more sustainedly about the nature and functioning of acts of
communication.6
When dealing with human motivation, the law appears almost
inevitably to have recourse to a language of intention, often to resolve
situations where intention, in our usual understanding of it, seems to
be inapposite. Thus we are told, for instance, that the confessions of
criminal suspects must be the "product of a free and rational will,"7
and that we can classify a confession as involuntary when it is the
product of a will that has been "overborne."8 Justice Frankfurter,
discussing the notion of the voluntary versus the coerced confession
in this latter case, noted that the concept of voluntariness is an
"amphibian" in that it is used at once to describe a psychic state and
to characterize that state for legal purposes.9 The law is in fact
inhabited by many such "amphibians," and it is important that they
be identified and subjected to a critical reading. For what may be at
stake in such terms is the crucial issue of our conception, as a society,
of what we want our criminal suspects to be, as human agents. What
do we conceive it means to be an autonomous human actor in the
face of criminal procedure? What moral and psychological charac-
terizations do we wish to deploy? What have we learned from
Dostoevsky, not to mention Freud, about the "free and rational will"?
Has this any relevance? Even without recourse to Dostoevsky or
Freud, can we be content with the law's hermetic, impoverished, and
sometimes wildly fictional accounts of human motivation, intention,
states of mind?
My friendly quarrel with Sarat, then, comes down to my belief that
"Law and Humanities," while it may mean many things, ought always
to include the idea of interference and interruption; of a practice
3. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
4. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6. I think, for instance, of Roman Jakobson's famous chart of the functions of language. See
Roman Jakobson, Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics, in STYLE IN LANGUAGE 350
(Thomas Sebeok ed., 1960).
7. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985).
8. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
9. Id. at 605.
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whereby the ways of reading developed in one field are used to
expose the exclusions and self-delusions of the other. This effort
should create some suspicion that the law's hermeticism does not
always provide an adequate basis for adjudication of the large social
and human issues that come before it. I must concede to Sarat that I
have as yet no evidence that this practice has changed or will change
legal "business as usual," which is singularly immune to contamination
from the outside. In this sense, the "law and literature" enterprise
could be largely futile. Still, I would argue that it would be a pity if
the humanistic critique of the language and rhetorical practices of the
law were to give up the humble backstairs position it has acquired in
some of our law schools; even handmaidens or scullery maids can
sometimes disrupt the dinnertable conversations of their masters.
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